The end of transformation and the reshaping of European security: Challenges, contradictions and prospects

During the 1990s a specific power constellation materialized in the international system: The rise of the USA as its hegemonic factor. Correspondingly the European Union emerged as the engine of economic, technological and political integration in Europe. Nolens volens, in spite of missing internal political homogeneity and held back by an unfinished institutional makeup, the EU was propelled into a position of being the most powerful geopolitical actor in Europa. This was recognized more in the Eastern parts of the continent than in Brussels itself.
And of course, given the dire consitions of the post-Soviet Russia, these developments were not matched by similar processes in the East of Europe.

While the specter of a great war disappeared altogether with the demise of the Soviet Union, conflicts in the space we call “Europe in-between”, i.e. the sphere between the European Union and post-Soviet Russia, are still unsettled and carry an explosive potential .
Fyodor Lukyanov, the chief editor of “Russia in Global Affairs” is precisely pointing to this threat. „Nobody denies that Ukraine will be the main battleground in the impending geopolitical confrontation. The situation there is fraught with the possibility of wide-scale destabilization and intervention by foreign powers. The entire post-Soviet landscape increasingly resembles a minefield where the slightest sudden movement could lead to yet another explosion.”

Twenty years after the collapse of the division lines in Europe, it is distinctly more difficult to deal with regional conflicts on a cooperative and multilateral basis, or to reach a consensus on arms and arms control. And to the extent that the number and intensity of conflicts are increasing, the dangers of escalation are growing. Stability and peace in Europe are under threat.

Developments such as the previous wars in the Balkans, the disputes over Kosovo and the Russian-Georgian war have increasingly called this into question. Central Asia, although not thought of as an integral part of Europe, but nevertheless belonging to the OSCE, is riddled with internal conflicts and external animosities which can explode into violent inter-state conflicts. In addition, Central Asia’s neighbourhood to Afghanistan cast another shadow over the regions prospects of stability. In case of a sudden or even coordinated withdrawl of NATO and/or the US expedition forces, the stability of the installed military protectorate is far-off from secure. It is widely feared that its collapse will send far reaching repercussions through Central Asia, may be even to Russia and to other neighbouring regions, i.e. the Persian Gulf and Pakistan.

Indeed in Europe, both, the US-led enlargement of NATO to the East and the integration of Central European states into the European Union then compensated for the loss of consensus which initially brought the bipolar system down. Consequently chances to build a new peace order on the basis reached with the Charta of Paris 1990 were not pursued . As a consequence, the loss of consensus led to the re-emergence of zero-sum-thinking in foreign and security policies. Therefore frequently political decisions were perceived quite differently by the states concerned. This applies particularly, though not exclusively, to a number of EU countries and Russia. What to one party appears to be a natural and legitimate reaction is perceived by the other as hostility – the classic security dilemma. Yet the current treaties and institutional mechanisms available for dealing with such asymmetries of perception are proving less and less effective and appropriate.

Only the changes in the international system after 9/11 and the emergence of new global centers of growth drew attention to such problems as the lack of the security dimension. But the following “honeymoon” between the US and the EU on the one side and Russia on the other did not last lonf. From 2004 onwards an icy climate ruled the political atmosphere, leading to accusations that a new “Cold Peace” was in the making.
Starting in February 2007 with the President Putin’s speech in Munich and definetly by the events of August 2008 it became apparent that Europe right away requires a coherent strategy for peace and security.

This situation now has given rise to widespread disquiet in many European countries, both at state level and among non-governmental organizations. There are also various ideas and proposals of differing scope and provenance concerning how peace in Europe can be made more secure. But these ideas and proposals must be examined, consolidated, and developed. In particular, there must be a purposeful debate on the planning and concrete implementation of a multilateral cooperative security system in Europe – in short, a new European peace order.

2.    New Situations Require New Responses: Changes in the international system and their geopolitical repercussions on Europe

The focus of this paper will touch upon the major changes in the international situation as they concern Europe. These include, on the one hand, changes in the prevailing threats since the 1990s, which necessitated the extension of the security agenda to encompass the political, economic, social, and environmental dimensions. On the other hand, the shifts of power in the world order due to the emerging countries must also be taken into consideration: so far, these shifts have been reflected only sporadically in the governance architecture and the international negotiation agenda. The central question is what is therefore needed for a cooperative security system in Europe that takes these processes properly into account?

Three factors require particular consideration in this connection:


•    The EU as an apprehensive soft player in a geopolitical power struggle

The EU has the potential to play an important role in the creation of the future world order. Although it already possesses suitable political instruments the European Union is often prevented from acting by internal conflicts of interest. As a result, the EU is in danger of falling short in the development of a common foreign and security policy (CFSP).
Key threats in this regard include failing to clarify its relations with the USA and Russia and to decide what role the EU will play in Zwischeneuropa [“middle Europe”, or Europe in-between], that band of countries stretching from the Baltic Sea to the area between the Black Sea and the Caspian . The countries in this region are too weak to elude the influence of their larger neighbors; they are caught between Russia and the EU and constitute a field of conflict in which Europe, the USA, and Russia will continue to clash if they are unable to find ways of dealing with conflict and reaching consensus.

There is enough reason to the argument that the failure to develop a Common European Foreign and Security Policy is closely connected with the issue of NATO and the positioning of the EU in the transatlantic framework.

To sharpen the point: the collapse of the Soviet Union weakened the raison d\'etre for the presence of American troops in Europe. This issue is lingering on. It did not leave the European agenda. Nonetheless, on the one side splits among European countries and on the other the experiences of European indecisiveness during the wars on the Balkans proved the inability and lack of consensus among EU member states to formulate a common position. Such inablity prolonged the process of clarification and decision making in regard to the CFSP. In addition, disparate interest in the EU and in NATO started to get even more complicated by the end of the 1990s. The entry of Central European countries into NATO and as members of the EU distorted the process even more. NATO was reactivated again and simultaneously images about a common European security policy moved into the background. In particular the Central European countries, the former states of the Warsaw Pact, maintained their Russia phobia and defined the USA as the ultimate security guarantee against Moscow. The dismissal of the European constitution in 2005, followed by the temporary postponement of the Treaty of Lisbon, added new barriers to the CFSP.

Although the perspective for ratifying the Lisbon Treaty improved considerably in the second half of 2009, it remains uncertain that the EU can reach the required consensus to act as a geopolitical power block in international politics. These, despite key challenges are to be mastered. Above all, the EU needs to clarify its relations with the USA and Russia.

However the most important challenge relates to Zwischeneuropa, will be a crucial factor where the question of peace and stability in Europe will be decided. This band of states is situated at the friction line between Russia and the European Union. Even more precarious, the countries in this region are too instable and politically too heterogenous to coordinate their efforts in order to build a peace and security order of their own. In addition, they do not have the political will to provide collectively for their own stability, well-being and security.A similar picture is true for the Caucasus and for Central Asia.
They cannot elude the influence of their larger neighbors. They are caught between Russia and the EU and constitute a field of conflict in which the European Union, the USA, and Russia will continue to clash unless ways and proposals are agreed upon of dealing with potential conflicts resulting from internal fighting or external interventions or both. Given the socioeconomic and political weakness of the region the outside powers share a common responsibility for regional stability.

However, in spite of all setbacks and unfulfilled foreign policy and security projects, the EU is not any more the EC of the past millennium. More unwillingly the EU has been transformed into a geopolitical actor and has announced its interests and role particularly in „Zwischeneuropa“ever since the electoral crisis of 2004 in the Ukraine. However, it would be wrong to associate the rise of the EU and its role in Zwischeneuropa with a new edition of the "Great Game". Nevertheless the question remains unanswered, who will control this space with all its energy resources and with its strategical location for transport routes at last?

As a result, Zwischeneuropa oscillates between two poles, namely the European Union on the one hand and the Russian Federation. This situation describes a vicious circle which is hardly to be broken without conflicts. The very existence of both geopolitical power centers exerts influence on domestic politics of each country in this area. And equally both external power centers are put under pressure by even those domestic powers they helped to create or to support in their quest for increasing their own interests or influence. The result is domestic instability, political strife and the polarization of regional/national elites. Taken the external and the internal factors together, we are confronted with a constant shift in power relations which tend to undermine, even to dissolve the existing Status Quo. Such situation leads to instability, political uncertainties, and possible conflicts.

In a twist of history, the highly volatile and instable situation of Zwischeneuropa puts a question back on the agenda which was lastingly avoided in EU-Russia relations throughout the last two decades. At issue is the crucial issue what kind of relationship should exist between the EU and Russia?.
The argument sounds strange given the plethora of forums, annual intergovernmental summits between Moscow and Brussels, or the PCA etc. which developed during the last 15 years. However, despite all the excitement about declarations of strategic partnership, the EU never developed a coherent foreign and security policy with Russia. It never became clear if Russia was a preferred and equal partner, or just a dependent scholar who had to accept Brussels wisdom on democratic values and liberal market philosophy. Viewed through the Brussels spectacles during the nineties Russia was a precarious and inconvenient neighbour, economically in dire conditions, politically permanently tumbling on the edges of a systemic crisis, and haunted by illusions of former grandeur. However, the country was regarded as a reliable source of raw materials and energy- to put it bluntly: more an object than a subject of its own history and position in international politics.

Given the socio-economic situation of Russia in the 1990s, the EU was not pressed to define its relationship in other terms as presented in the PCA and elsewhere: Brussels was in the driver’s position to define the content, goals and limits of cooperation. Therefore the dialogue between both Moscow and Brussels showed at times quite surrealistic traits.

But the situation altered with the changes unleashed in Russia in the Putin presidency. Russia regained political stability, the state regained authority, the economy started to boom, and the country became again a factor in international politics. Consequently, the EU and Russia moved closer, became increasingly more interdependent, definetly in economic terms. And the moment the EU threw its hat into the ring of raging domestic conflicts in the Ukraine in winter 2004/05, Brussels subsequently became an actor in the region Moscow considered her sphere of influence. Being a prisoner of its own normative gospels Brussel could not act as an objective arbiter, it took sides in the emerging disputes on energy deliveries through that transit country. The Ukrainian issue, the approval of Solanas “Security Strategy” for the EU a year before, and Sarkozy’s intervention to settle the Caucasian conflict of August 2008 clearly demonstrated to Moscow, that its long hedged fears of geopolitical competition in “Zwischeneuropa” had become a reality.

Taken together, today we are confronted with quite an extraordinary situation in EU-Russia relations:

•    We do see both the high potential of conflicts, but as well the need for cooperation in the area in between the EU and Russia.
•    Russia has regained her position as a major power in international politics, and certainly will expand her role to shape European politics in the future.
•    Ironically, the EU, long a dormant player, temporarily immobilized by the failure of its constitutional project, and the harsh internal controversies over the Lisbon treaty, acted depite all these adverse factors as an independent geopolitical power.
•    Given the deplorable state of the European Security and Defence Policy, ESDP, and lacking operative means, the foundation of Brussels involvement in Eastern Europe and Central Asia is based on soft power mechanisms and instruments.

And, these instruments were played astonishingly well and proved effective. May be the very lack of hard power instruments caused such efficiency, because the menace of an escalating conflict was absent. The conflicting sides were forced into a dialogue to solve matters by conciliation, and peacefully.

Considering the violent history of Europe, the failure to build a military branch under the EU umbrella, or to breathe life into ESDP, may be not so harmful at all. Since the spectre of war has lost its menacing supremacy, it seems that the EU is better equipped to meet the new challenges after the end of bipolrarity. And Brussel can offer
Brussels focus on peaceful, soft means, i.e. a permanent dialogue, by offering access to its economic prosperous area or by preferential economic treatment and special relationships. And if we look at Russia, the country’s leadership is completely helpless if confronted with the EU’s innovative, economic and technological potential. Given the situation Russia is in need to modernize, diversify the economy, to attract foreign direct investments and technology to stimulate and implement the goals of modernization. To achieve such goals the country does need a stable, reliable environment and trustworthy partners. Therefore, Sergei Karaganov pointed out in an interesting statement already in 2005, “close interaction with the EU remains an imperative of Russia’s policy” .

However, if we accept for the moment the statement by Karaganov, which includes the US as well as a partner for Russia, then the question is not only that the EU needs to develop a strategy/policy for Russia. Likewise Moscow has do follow suit. Both European geopolitical power blocs have to take the initiative to clarify their relation and their role in European politics. Both have to live up to their common responsibility and obligation to create a peaceful Europe.

And this time there will be little help from Washington.

•    The end of US world hegemony and the demise of the unipolar world

The geopolitical decline of the USA can be explained by many factors. The demise was a rather gradual process, already under way before the new millennium and the Iraq war. Already the bipolar system saw a very specific asymmetry between the US‘s geostrategical ability of power projection on the one hand and the loss of economic competiveness, i.e. in industry and even in some sectors of high technology. However, during bipolarity, geostrategy and block obedience dominated the agenda and the US was unchallenged as the hegemocic leader within international regimes, such as the WTO or the IMF, or NATO and other global alliances. On the other hand, Washington did not interfere with the steady increase of the economic potential of her European and Asian allies. Already during the 1980s the leading role oft the US dwindled. Apart from the defense sector, the economic supremacy of the USA whas forced back subsequently. According to Paul Kennedy, the decline of the US as a geopolitical power center of world politics is not over yet. The US is not in danger to disappear as a factor altogether, but due to the present financial and economic crisis the geopolitical weight will move East to Asia .

The new millennium saw the emergence of new powers such as China, India, and Brazil, among others. In its wake a far-reaching realignment of global political power is under way, taking into account the relative diminution of the importance of the USA. As a result, there is a growing discrepancy between the USA’s unaltered leadership claims and its ability to lead. The effects of the present global financial and economic crisis can only make things worse. Even radical conservatives and former crusaders for American supremacy like Francis Fukyama , question now the longevitity of the US- model, and pointing to the end of US world hegemony.

To stem against such trend the new Obama-Administration is putting political emphasis especially on security issues and tries to pursue a multipolar and cooperative approach. Nonetheless, the direction of such course is not settled yet due to rising opposition of right wing forces and the predominance of social and economic problems. The US seems to be in limbo, trapped in various possible options of development: First, a cooperative, multipolar approach in security and foreign policy would stress a stronger reliance on trans-Atlantic allies; or second, a new edition of an isolationist course could result in the renaissance of selective global policies as we have seen them latest during the 1970s.

Crucial in this respect is ensuring the cooperation of the emerging powers and creating the requisite institutional conditions. The new US administration to all appearances is keen to play a constructive role in this and to employ more strongly multilateral mechanisms for the purpose.
Initiatives towards a new European peace order could also benefit from this – they have no prospect of success without constructive US participation. A European security system that seeks to “contain” or oppose Russia is equally inconceivable.

•    Russia’s come back as a European power and the Eurasian temptation

Undoubtedly, Russia’s international role is no longer the one played by the Soviet Union in the Cold War. But at the same time the country ceased long ago to be the pawn on the chess-board of international politics, as it was in the 1990s. Due to favorable external conditions, both economic and political, Russia has returned as an actor of the international system.

However, Russia’s rise to a geopolitical power in Europe is as well the outcome of domestic developments which resulted from policies introduced during the presidency of Wladimir Putin. Just to illustrate a few crucial ones: The authority of the state was restored, regional and oligarchic powers factions were removed from national politics, the social, educational and medical unstitutions were improved. The enhancement of material and social living conditions, stable and rising incomes of the population brought in its tow social stability and legitimacy for the political leadership. For the first time since the chaotic decade of the Yeltsin-era, the Russian state recaptured his capacity to render decisions, and to state its interests within the international community. At the end of Putins second term in office we can diagnose that the political stabilisation was concluded and deformations from the Yeltsin\'s system were removed to a great extent. The new power structure rested on a fundamentally different basis: a loyal mass party, Edinaja Rossia, was created which. This aspect alone, and the following change in leadership releases hope for a possible future transformation towards a more pluralist and open political system.

Furthermore, within a decade the country pulled itself out from a state of complete stagnation and systemic crisis. Steadily moving upscale it found a place under the 10 leading international economies. This does not imply that the Kremlin uses the new authority rationally. Neither can be declared that the Kremlin is putting foreward concepts to implement goals of modernization effectively. In addition, there is always a dark side to top down concepts of modernization. The price paid for stability is high and amply portrayed in Western media and political circles.

Russia’s social and political stability and the material well-being of the country were given by a favourable array of external factors. This situation has been prolonged. Like before, domestic stability and wealth depend to a great extent on high public revenues whose sources lie beyond the controlling power of the Kremlin. In the present economic and financial global cris the vulnerability of the Russian economy was highlightened. Despite all the fuss about modernization and diversification, Russia’s basic role as a provider of energy and raw materials for the EU and other growth centers of the world economy did not change principally.

Both, the economic success story and the achievements of domestic stability have left marks in the formulation of Russian foreign and security policy. While the Kremlin and the country’s power elite wanted to win back what got lost with the breakdown of the USSR, the awareness is growing that the restoration of an imperial Russia is out of the question. The core of Russian interests can be described as following: to be recognized as an international great power which is invited to participate in the creation of the new world order equally besides the USA and Europe.
In this regard Moscov is a revisionist power. Since the second part of the 1990s Moscow embarked upon a path of a multivector policy which in essence shows a triangular shape: the core idea is to establish and maintain good relations with Washington, the EU and China. However, within its triangular shape, the focus may shift according to the rise of opportunities or worsening of relations.

While no new menace is intended Russia still aims at a revision of the international order, although there is no notion, concept or even consensus in Russian expert circles, how the new world order should look alike. It is certain only that the present order is not accepted with the USA as a global hegemonial power. But this image is evaporating with the demise of US hegemony. Accordingly Russian critique turns more and more into a ritual, deflecting the very fact, that the proposed amorphous counterfigure of the multipolar lacks substance.

Conflicts and controversies resulting from such uncertainties are as obvious as the search for allies. This has been always a basic premise of interest-led “Realpolitik”. Therefore the Kremlin stepped in the footprints of the former Soviet Union and tried to reanimate alliances that were forgotten a decade long. But Moscow also tries cautiously to build up new alliance constellations which still seemed inconceivable a few years ago. As an example we can only point in this context to the Shanghai Coordination Organisation/ SCO and the Eurasian Collective Security Treaty Organisation /CSTO which enclose so difficult and complicated state groups like Russia, China, the Central Asian states, but also India, Pakistan and Iran want to enter or participate. Functions and intergovernmental arrangements still dominate the base of cooperation in the SCO. Institutiona are not in sight and are not planned.

Regardless such moves, Russia is not turning away from Europe. Even if an Asian window will be opened in Russia’s foreign policy, based on a network of close economic, military and political cooperation, it looks quite unlikely that Moscow will deviate from the course of its triangular foreign policy design.

This assessment is based on the simple fact that the economic and political relations between the EU and its member states and Russia are too intertwined. A strong interdependence pulls them together: they share mutual interests. We need only too look at trade and investment figures. Of course, there is room for improvement of the trade between Russia and China, but Europe is the preferred trading partner in industrial equipment and technology needed for the modernization of Russia’s old Soviet industry. The phrase of the “Modernisierungspartnerschaft”, partnership for modernization, is not so wrong.

And keeping in mind that oil and politics are always moving into the same direction, this saying is even truer for the world of gas.
If we look at China’s pressure on the Kremlin since 2002 to construct oil and gas pipelines, the picture is not too rosy. It took nearly half a decade for the Kremlin to warm up to the issue: too high and deeply rooted are fears of the Chinese presence at the Siberian border. In the next five to ten years only a fraction of oil and gas which flows to Europe will be send to China. Taken together, the two new gas pipelines under construction and in planning, the Nord Stream and ultimately the South Stream, correct the picture that an Eurasian option is swelling in Russia’s policy.
On top of top, given the economic and political interdependence between the EU and Russia things must go very wrong if Moscov would opt for a confrontational course with the EU.

But the conflictual dissension between NATO and the EU on the one hand, and Russia on the other reflects a glaring asymmetry of perceptions that must be addressed. The Russian side has offered a number of proposals to this end which of course reflect their national interests which above all intend to stop the third wave of NATO enlargement to the East.

3.    The heritage of common responsibility for peace and security in Europe

As paradoxically as it may appear Europe’s future guarantee for peace and security was already formulated in the past. Even before the Soviet Union as an empire vanished together with all of her military, economic and political organizations a peace order for the whole of Europe was drafted, i.e. the Charta of Paris. However, as has been argued, this path was not followed. Instead the two rounds of NATO-enlargement to the East rendered NATO a new identity as the sponsor of sovereignty and stability for Central and East European countries.Simultaneously Russia was pushed to the side lines of European policy.
That Western powers could push aside so easily preceding grand designs, like the idea of a “Common European House”, is as well related to the systemic crisis of Post-Soviet Russia during the 1990s. The political and economic crisis changed the threat perception fundamentally in comparison with previous ones concerning the Soviet Union‘s military might. Although during the nineties up to now no military menace was ascertained by transatlantic circles, or was held likely, the alliance proceeded down the path of strengthening its military power and started to define itself as the ultimate reinsurance against any possible perils resulting from the chaotic process of transformation in Russia (unpredictability of domestic policy, economic decline, spocial impoverishment of large sections of the population, expected political polarisation, if not even separatist fragmentation of Post-Soviet Russia). Undoubtedly this new acquired rationale rendered to NATO a new legitamacy, i.e. above all, a new right to exist which was extended by the end of the 1990s when the second and/or third round of the Eastern enlargement was decided.

Of course the unfolding of NATO’s new mission was perceived in Russia as an attempt of exclusion. It promoted protests and furious responses among the new Russian power elites, while the trans-Atlantic community deliberately neglected or cast aside such grievances. No doubt, Russia became the match ball of international politics during the 1990s. And not without reason the slogan of a “world without Russia” circulated in Washington. From the beginning of the 1990s until the Iraq war 2003, the USA acted as the hegemonic powerr in the international state system.
The situation started to change with the second term of Putin’s presidency. Let me remind you of two incidents.

The Caucasus conflict of 2008, as before the "alarm call" (Lawrow) of the Russian president in the Munich security conference in 2007 raised as well in some Western circles the awareness that there was something wrong or missing in the security structure of Europe.

NATO’s policy of enlargement to the East ran into fierce opposition from Moscow once the borderline to the Commenwealth of Indeoendent States/CIS had been touched. The litmus test happened in Georgia, but the real conflict exploded over attempts by the former Bush-Administration to permit NATO membership to the Ukriane. The attempt to extend the Membership Action Plan/MAP to Kiew failed in the wake of the EU - brokered truce over Georgia. In the controversy it became clear that a return to „business as usual“between the EU and Russia was out of the question.
Luckily, Moscow and the EU found common ground to settle for the interim the Georgian conflict. Thus the emergence of two hostile camps in Europe was prevented. Time was bought and awareness rose that some idea of a new European peace order was needed and to be put on the agenda. In wake of the pressure, the Bush Administration applied on its European allies, to support the entry of Tbilissi and Kiev into NATO, some European politicians, like the former German Foreign Minister Joschka Fisher, compellingly argued for a new debate on European security. According to Fisher, the previous formula, resting on NATO’s eastern enlargement had ran out of steam and instead of projecting stability the policy now produced conflicts and animosities .

4.    Building blocks for a new European security architecture

Unacceptable as it may be, but neither side has any concrete notion of where to go from here. The Russian president Dmitri Medwedew addressed the issue in his June speech in Berlin 2008, and some ideas were added in Evians later, but a comprehensive and debatable project is not in sight. Only the Russian intentions seem to be clear: to stop NATO’s further enlargement to Eastern Europe, and protect some parts of the CIS from falling under Western influence.

It came as no surprise that most of the memberstates of the EU and NATO refused to go along with the idea to discuss European security. For the majority of them the issue has been solved in a satisfactory manner, once and for ever.

Others who were willing or tempted to look into the future and accept the Russian proposal did pick up the debate conditionally. For them any discussion on Europe’s future security has to enshrine the existing institutional set up of security. In other words, there is room for incremental changes and flexibility, but any new initiative must respect the security structures presently given, especially NATO, and the EU. The CSCE and CSTO did not enter at that point the debate.

This of course leads to the questions, essentially for the course of this debate. First, exists there at all any political will on the Western side to open and eventually modify those institutions; Second, if so, is there a need to build additional one’s which then could jointly strengthen the capacity on the existing security structure? Third, in the probable case of an agreed upon new institutional framework for European security in the future, what would be the role of both, the US and Russia? Would they become members of the arrangement or only outside sponsors?
Needless to emphasize that such a debate must take into consideration some of the arguments earlier raised, foremost the changed constellation of power in the international state system. Most important are the following questions:

1) Can the emerging multipolar system replace the present unipolar design and guarantee a high level of stability?
2) Or will the relative decline of the US hegemony lead to unpredicted consequences for regional peace and stability?
3) Is there really a change of paradigm in US foreign and security policy to search for cooperation in order to meet international challenges? But for following such path the Obama Administration needs both, a strong domestic consensus and support from European allies. On top of these preconditions, Moscow has to demonstrate its willingness for improved relations.

To push the “reset button” was a nice PR-show- more important will be to stick to the time table in arms reduction talks. US-Russia talks progressed, and by December 2009 a new START agreement is projected. The fields for cooperation are ample. Too similar challenges plague both powers: Non-proliferation, nuclear disarmament, START, the common suspicion about the polical intentions of some BRIC-states, notebably China, the aspirations of Iran and South Korea to acquire nuclear weapons and long-range projection capabilities, international terrorism, the fate of the UN-military operation in Afghanistan and the danger that this conflict will spill over on neighbouring nuclear Pakistan.

The topics and the field for cooperation are well known. If the Kremlin honestly wants some change and opts for a closer and more significant place in the European security structure than now is the time to act, and to demonstrate readiness. This implies more concrete projects and interaction with Western powers in the security field. However, action was missing for most of the nineties after the demise of the USSR. At least, an intensified and open dialog would open up chances to think about options for a future security and peace order in Europe.
The following three options are conceivable:

•    The NATO - Russia Council will be empowered to take action on European security issues and/or Russia becomes a member of NATO

Already once, early in the “romantic phase” of post-Soviet foreign policy the stratagem arose of the country’s membership in NATO. Blocked in 1994 with NATO’s eastern enlargement the option never lost its attraction. The Clinton-Administration compensated Moscow’s resentment against the first round of NATO’s extension by creating the NATO-Russia Council in 1997. In 2002, w hen Moscow joined the international coalition against terrorism, Russia was de facto converted to an “informal ally” accoding to the then used formula of the Bush-Administration, and cosequently received better conditions in the council’s new format. The honeymoon ended somewhere at the end of 2003. Russian domestic affairs, the trial against Chodorkowski, played into the hands of Western media, which launched a bitter and vicious campaign. Russia was accused of harbouring still unresolved imperial attitudes, that it uses energy as a political weapon against weaker neighbours, and that domestically the political development had been tilted away from a democratic course towards authoritarian and undemocratic rule of the Kremlin leaders. Of course the media’s onslaught was echoed all over Europe.

As difficult as it may be, the above mentioned choice to upgrade the NATO-Russia-Council is in all probability more promising than other options which may look more favourable at the first glance. Simply both geopolical powers, the US and Russia are already functioning in one institution. Contrary to the OSCE, this organization had not lost its relevance in political and military terms.

Pointless to accentuate, that a successful interaction of external and internal factors would be needed in order to kick off such a course. First, such option can only be realized if a maximum of peaceful conditions prevails, if cooperation and willingness to solve problems/conflicts commonly is demonstrated and proven. Only then the restoration of mutual trust can be revived. Second, Russia’s political system needs to be overhauled. However, not in the senseless manner typically of earlier attemps from the outside, namely by pushing either the standards of Brussels or Washington, but rather reflecting Russia’s quest for modernization. Modernisation of the country’s economic and social system is only conceivable if fundamental defects are taken care of: a successful fight against corruption and against the misuse of power by public servants. It is essential for her own goals of transformation/modernization that Russia succeeds in the fight for the rule of law. This seems more important than being expoused to external teaching lessons on democracy.

Steps in both directions will take time- the process will be a long term one. But it would be already a good sign if during the life span of the Obama-Administration consultations would increase and mechanisms for decision-making in the NATO-Russia Council would improve. For example, the situation of “Zwischeneuropa” or the possible threat from domestic implosions/civil unrest in Central Asia need to be put on the agenda, to take precautions and allow for common actions.

Such policy could lead to an agreement in the case of Central Asia to combine efforts, exchange informations on threat and security perceptions, and to prepare for common action, either peace keeping or conflict prevention. A closer cooperation above all in military terms between both NATO and ODKB is desirable and feasible.

Such step by step policy may not satisfy Russian interests, but it seems to be the only way foreward to rebuild trust and eventually to overcome the present stalemate. Such attempts include as well the assurance that the smaller Western memberstates, but especially the new Cental European members of NATO will not obstruct from within the search for a new framework of European security. For realizing such a task, the willingness of the US to cooperate, even to lead the process, is momentarily essential. If European security concepts would be realized, first by a transformation or opening up of NATO bringing Russia in from the Cold, such development could lead to a more balanced and “Europeanized” NATO. In this respect the argument of two former high representatives of US-foreign policy is telling:

“Steps to reset NATO-Russian relations need to be taken now. The key goal should be to construct more durable and effective building blocks for cooperation rather than to strive for quick fixes. Above all, the leaders of the alliance should make an unequivocal commitment to the NATO-Russia Council with an aim to transform it into a genuine pan-European security forum. Founded in Rome in 2002, the council has been hampered by crises of confidence, but neither NATO nor Moscow has walked away. Accordingly, we should treat the council as a primary venue for a sustained security dialogue between Russia and the alliance”

“Second, NATO and Russia should go the extra mile to intensify military-to-military cooperation. One of the apparently forgotten achievements of U.S. President Barack Obama’s July visit to Moscow was the signing of a series of military agreements to deepen bilateral exchanges and joint exercises between the two countries. NATO should utilize this blueprint and try to increase cooperation with the Russian armed forces in order to strengthen day-to-day contacts between our military forces. In addition, Russia and NATO should boost joint peacekeeping and combined training, increase intelligence sharing in the fight against terrorism, deploy joint maritime patrols and expand their cooperation in research and development with a focus on effective regional missile defenses in Europe.”

However, Europeans should be aware, that too close a US-Russia cooperation could restore a pattern well known from the times of bipolarity. During that time Europe was for both of them an instrumentalized and dependent junior partner which had no say in the decisionmaking process of international and even European politics.

•    To develop the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement into a tool for peace preservation in Europe

Despite differences and disagreements, mostly on normative issues, the relations between Russia and the EU show an astonishing resilience. They rest on a density of contacts, high level polical relations, economic interdependence, and socio-cultural links which exceed even the ones with the US. Nevertheless, given the heterogeneous character and composition of the EU, any initiative, not to speak of its implementation, to change well established ground rules of European security will be extremely difficult a task. An indicator for the inflexibility of the EU in this matter is the already mentioned fate of the CFSP. Since years the debate stalls, and accordingly the full implementation of the little what was achieved. To expect the situation to change is wishful thinking, at least at the moment. Most memberstates of the EU see their security needs taken care of in institutions outside of the EU, i.e. in NATO. And as long as there is no reliable alternative, this view will not change. To break such a vicious circle is hard and nearly impossible, if the present Status quo, which satisfies practically the majority of EU memberstates, is not seriously threatened.

Again, the key for change rests with Washington. If a reliable accord between both powers, the US and Russia, would be established, resistance and animosities against the notion to consider Russia a safeguard for peace and stability in Europe would slowly decrease. However, at the same time the notion for a solely “European” project would loose its persuasion, unless external circumstances render a push to the project of European Foreign and Security Policy/EFSP.

Presently we are in a state of debates on the prolongation of the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement/PCA between the EU and Russia which were resumed early on in 2009. The draft treaty, already agreed upon in St. Petersburg in May 2003, contains an interesting clause which may become a helpful tool in this respect. One of the four dimensions of the new PCA seeks to strengthen “the Dialog and Cooperation in international relations”. Both Russia and the EU are committed to strive for a multilateral world order and render support for the central role of the UN to maintain peace. Further, both sides agreed to cooperate on security issues and crisis management in order to address global and regional threats and challenges. They want to cooperate in the strugggle against terrorism and stop the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.To fullfil such tasks both sides pledged to intensify their communication on security, human rights and are seeking to deepen their military cooperation.

The EU is no NATO, and Russia does not regard the EU as a potential military threat. Nonetheless, Moscow fears its economic, financial and technological supremacy which sends signals of attraction into the former Soviet orbit. Regardless if the EU is backing its persuasive rays of attraction with tangible policy proposals or not, it’s sheer objective existence propels the EU to be an actor in Eastern Europe. Even more so, the EU cannot withdraw from its function. Indisputable the EU is the alternative power block in Europe and therefore a competitor to Moscow as long as both country’s concepts of modernization are diametrically different, at least in political terms.

Consequently, and the EU cannot escape from the above mentioned dilemma, there is only one foreseeable way out: to establich within the institutional framework of PCA a subinstitution or a responsible forum (parity is important) which should deal with aspects of overall-European security. This would imply that the EU should act in a capacity of speaking for the whole of Europe. On the other side Russia is asked to define and state her interest and goals more clearly. Including an answer to the overriding question, if the country envisages steps which would bring it closer to NATO and the EU?

In the process leading up to such possible arrangements, very concrete policy actions should be implemented to build mutual confidence and help to destroy the negative image painted in Western media.

Fields of action are plenty.Some are directly related to European security, others touch upon a common understanding of global challenges, e.g. global ecological concerns, like the effects of climate change on migration, or joint initiatives to restart economic growth.

A closer look at the most probable area where future conflicts could happen, points to Central Asia. But the conflicts in the Caucasus are far from settled, and the situation in Zwischeneuropa is not at all stable. Conflict prevention by both geopolitical power blocks could achieve a lot in pacifying these regions. Their political and economic goals match in most cases: they both strive for regional stability, the avoidance of failed states and that souvereign, economic solid and open political regime would be established. And it is clear from the history of conflicts in this part of Europe that applying zero -sum strategies would only lead to devastating consequences. Therefore, their respective policies should stress the aspect of common responsibility for these regions. Pulled by such goal identification steps to build an institutional frame could follow. What is relevant and true for Zwischeneuropa can be extended to Central Asia and the Caucasus. But the crucial question is one of time. A window of opportunity is only given as long as the present Obama-Administration is in power.

5.    Reassessment of the OSCE: a second Charta

The institution most prepared and specially designed to deal with concepts of European security is of course the OSCE. However, the institution is in a highly deplorable state. Not only the Charta of Paris was pushed aside in the early 1990s, the OSCE lost its reputation and is today only a shadow of it, torn apart by internal conflicts and instrumentalised by member states.

The OSCE was not able to prevent or halt the war in the Caucasus 2008. There is only a small chance that it will play some role in the so-called “Corfu Process,” which was initiated to discuss the Russian idea of forming a new architecture of European security. In reality an institutional overhaul of the OSCE is needed, but presently neither in the interests of Washington nor Moscow.

For the time being, it seems to be impossible. Efforts to breathe new life into the institution were made by the former German foreign minister Steinmeier in Helsinki 2008 . But the major actors on the field do not show any interest. Regrettably, despite the fact that the dream of a common area of mutual stability, security and peace from Brest to Vladivostok is not forgotten, the spirit which left the bottle and shaped the unification of Europe in the course of the Helsinki process cannot be put back. In other words,at present, the OSCE is not the institution to initiate a debate on such essential projects.

There may be a future need again for a modified OSCE. Not that the mssion needs to change. But such hope can only be rewarded, if a durable consensus over the institutional and political framework of a new security order in Europe could be attained among the major powers.