Political Elites of the Commonwealth of Independent States in the Dialogue of Civilizations

At all stages of its evolution, the Russian state has always been distinguished by a high degree of heterogeneity – territorial, ethnographic, confessional and socio-economic – with the level of development different from land to land. Under those conditions the modernization (interpreted in broad sense - as the achievement of new quality of economic, social and cultural landmarks) could be achieved through a mobilization model of development (Fonotov 1993) with bureaucracy acting as the bearing structure and the main actor of such model formation (Gaman-Golutvina 2006a). Only this model was able to bring about the modernization in Russia. This model implies that the ruling elite was recruited primarily on de-personalized grounds of professional competence maximally free from ineffective criteria (kindred and ethnic relations, corruption motives, etc.).  The dichotomy of the feudal and bureaucratic models of organizing elites as proposed by G. Moska (Moska 1939) may be considered to be the most successful conceptualization pattern of this case.

As it is known, Mosca’s dichotomy deepened and concretised the corresponding findings by N. Machiavelli (Machiavelli 1990: 12-13) and M.Weber  (Weber 1990: 650).  From Mosca\'s point of view, the feudal political power type is based upon the mergence of power and property, while the bureaucratic one is based on the diversity of economic and political management (Mosca 1939:80-83). In contemporary perception the feudal type of organisation could also be defined as an oligarchic one, since one of the key features of oligarchy is the mergence of power and property.
Medieval Europe is a classical example of power feudal organisation, since then Europe was like a conglomerate of small self-sufficient formations (from here came Mosca’s term “feudal”). The 20th century brought substantial changes into the organisation of European power: in spite of the serious influence of economic elites on political establishment recruitment and political decision-making processes in general, this influence is not effected directly - the functions of political management are realised by specialised bureaucracy.

It is known that Мosca considered Russia as an example of the state, managed by bureaucracy during the long historical periods (Mosca 1939:83-85). Such character of Russian power organisation was the result of the extremely difficult conditions of Russia\'s evolution (unfavorable climate, vast territory, repeated external aggressions, etc.), which determined the state primacy over other political institutions (Pipes 1981; Pipes 1990; Pipes 1994; Fonotov 1993; Mawdsley and White  2000). This, in its course, determined the fact that Russian political elites during considerable historical periods formed within the state, having coincided with the highest echelon of administrative and political bureaucracy. The ruling layerd of Kiev Russ and Moscow State (boyars), nobility and bureaucracy in the Russian Empire were based upon these principles. The “bureaucracy” principle constituted the basis for the soviet nomenclature recruitment (Gaman-Golutvina 2006a).

The difficulties of rolling over the principles of ‘rational bureaucracy’ management across the entire territory of the Russian Empire were conditioned by the fact that, along with territories historically run according to the ‘bureaucratic type’ (Russia, Ukraine, Byelorussia), the Russian Empire and the USSR also comprised the lands where kindred and family, ethnographic and confessional, patron and client (i.e., traditionalist in the broad sense of this word) relations formed not only the basis for the whole system of social relations but also served as the backbone for elite formation and as such impeded modernization. This is the reason why the history of Russian modernizations is marked with attempts at destroying the traditionalist principles of social organization. The detraditionalization policy was especially active in the 19th -20th centuries in Central Asia and Transcaucasia – the lands where the traditionalist structures were the backbone of the social organization and the targets of attacks in the modernization process. The 19th century colonization policy was pursued primarily by fitting the traditionalist structures to the imperial system of rule. In the Soviet period the course was set for destroying the cells of traditionalism. In particular, large-scale purges in the 1930s, intended to ensure the modernization of the ruling elite which mission was to modernize the whole system of socio-economic and political relations, can be considered as an element of the new policy. It is a historical fact that the implementation of this policy was accompanied by rather violent measures. However, no industrial modernization under such unfavorable conditions (the accelerated pace in the absence of important modernization resources (financial, historical, etc.) relevant for development) could occur without such measures. The measures intended to destroy the traditionalist structures obstructing modernization became elements of this policy.  In fact, “the hand of Moscow” was the instrument of modernization for all territories in its orbit, but particularly for those that were less developed as concerns the level of socio-economic, political and cultural development before they entered the Russian Empire and the USSR.

For mass groups of population in many post-Soviet states, the USSR disintegration turned into a large-scale de-modernization and re-traditionalization. This is one of the reasons why the statement of V. Putin, that the USSR collapse became the largest geopolitical calamity of the 20th century, is true. The responsibility for such distressing outcomes lies with the NIS political elites; firstly, because they are the key political actors setting the objectives and goals of post-communist transits , and secondly, because the rejection of modernization in many CIS countries became a conscious choice of the post-Soviet elites. The desire of the Soviet elites to convert power into property is not the last and not at all the least reason among the factors that determined the USSR disintegration. The process that began at the turn of the 1980s and 1990s, under the slogan of democratization, after 1991 became the revolution of elites. The dominant motive of the post-Soviet elites was the distribution of the previously built economic potential and a change in the model of revenue distribution in favor of the elites at the cost of the mass groups. Thus, nothing else but the egoistic mindset of the ruling elites became the reason for unsuccessful attempts to implement democratic transitions.

In our opinion, the experience of the CIS countries may help to concretize ideas (Higley and Lengyel 2000; Higley, Bayulgen and George 2003) concerning the relationship between the structural organization of elites and the political regimes. This experience allows us to identify the correlation between the model of elites organization and the political and economic policies they pursue. As a rule, based on the mold of traditionalist (patron-client) relations, elites act as the agents of de-modernization and re-traditionalization; the clientele may be considered the matrix of the socio-political archaic models. Organized on the principles of rational bureaucracy, the elites are able to ensure modernization. As to the methods of modernization, they may be different. Naturally, modernization carried out democratically is much more preferable compared to an authoritarian modernization. In our opinion, the USSR of Mikhail Gorbachev’s perestroika period had a real opportunity for democratic transition. However, this opportunity was not realized because of the ruling elite’s orientation towards nomenclatura privatization and the nomenclatura model for entering the market. Thus, today the realistic alternative for many CIS countries consists in the choice between authoritarian modernization and authoritarian re-traditionalization and de-modernization.

Looking at the evolution of the CIS countries from this angle, we can single out three groups of states. Two of them represent an almost ‘ideal type’ or ‘clean’ example of implementing the reference model. Byelorussia, on the one hand, is an example of a bureaucratically run state. On the other pole of this specter are five countries of post-Soviet Central Asia (CA), Azerbaijan and Georgia which embodied the model of the clannish elite. The third group of countries are the states maintaining an in-between position within the proposed line of analysis, or those post-Soviet polities marked by a complicated plexus and sometimes also by an acute struggle between different models (Russia, Ukraine, Armenia and Moldova).
To argue this position, we will review below the elite recruitment processes in Byelorussia,  the Central Asian (CA) countries and  Russia.

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One of the most important notions for conceptualization of the elite recruitment process in our context is patron-client linkage. To our way of thinking, the patron-client relationships, that have historically grown on the basis of feudal bondage between the vassal and the suzerain, can be seen as an important component of the ‘feudal’ model of power. Modern versions of personal bondage may acquire different forms, being based on various modifications of bondage – economic, ethnic, family, regional, etc. The concept of clientelism is called for in the context of post-Soviet statehood because patron-client relationships in the CIS countries, and primarily in Central Asia and Transcaucasia, became widespread. It is not accidental, therefore, that the notion of a kindred ‘clan’ is actively used in terms of analysis of elite recruitment processes in the CIS countries. In so doing, the notions of ‘patron-client relationship’ and of a ‘clan’ are not identical: the former is broader than the latter because it does not imply a compulsory clan kindredship and/or ethnic proximity. Nevertheless, both notions can be used to conceptualize the processes of elite formation in the CIS countries.

In the classical work by S. Eisenstadt and L. Roniger the patron-client links are considered as relations, which, besides supplying the necessary resources to the counterparts, also meet the need for confidence that is always a deficit item in a complex society. The methodological significance of the clientelism concept, if applied to the post-Soviet countries in Central Asia and Transcaucasia, is determined by the facts that (a) there is an obvious gap between the public form of rule and the actual power practices; and (b) these non-public power bodies monopolize governance (Eisenstadt and Roniger 1984). The following features of the patron-client relationship prove applicable to the countries of Central Asia and Transcaucasia: they are predominantly (a) personal, private and informal; (b) based on an inequitable possession of power resources and on differences in social status, while, at the same time, (c) based on reciprocal commitments and incentives (Lemerchand and Legg 1972; Wolf and Kinship 1966).

The crisis of modernization, especially if pursued at an accelerated pace (as was done in the Soviet period in Central Asia and in Transcaucasia), results in society’s “re-traditionalization” and strengthens traditional forms of the patron-client relationship. As Legg (1979) has shown, modernization and bureaucratization in the wake of modernization do not preclude patron-client relationships. Modernization in these countries mostly adapts them to the new way of life while traditional structures are still more powerful than contemporary social mechanisms that are turning into a formal exterior decoration for neo-traditionalist phenomena. The basis behind the ruling groups within countries that are pursuing forceful modernization are “primary” communities (a family, a clan). The role of patron-client relationships in the modernization process and increasingly during the crisis of modernization is to protect an individual against growing “estrangement”. Clientelism is rooted in people’s distrust of official institutions. In situations of crisis in formal institutions, ‘personal relations’ are set to confront official institutions and procedures. But neither tribal, nor inter-personal links can solve the problem of social consolidation. Nor can they save the society from falling apart and from the “war of everybody against everybody” - this requires the development of much broader forms of solidarity that go far beyond the local and national specificity. Proliferation of clientele relations in a society testifies to crises of social solidarity and national unity (Afanas’ev 1997).

The Role of the Clan and Family Factor in Central Asian Political Elite Recruitment

Any attempt to analyze the situation in Central Asia requires tracing societal, social, and cultural development tendencies and measuring up the cultural and historical potential for the nation-state buildup in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan.

The inclusion of the Central Asian territories in the Russian Empire initiated forced modernization processes. As a result, the development of nations, national identity, and state institutions is still going on in the former Soviet Central Asian republics.

Notwithstanding the 15-year history of independence of the Central Asian states, it would still be premature to talk about ethnic and national consolidation in the region. The prevalent indigenous population in each of these states is a conglomerate of sub-ethnic communities with different cultural, societal, and psychological specifics. These differences often dominate over ethnic and national unity. Sub-ethnic, tribal, clan, and territorial solidarity largely determine relationships among these people, which, in the long run, are considered as ensuring the individual’s social protection, well-being, and psychological comfort. In other words, cliental relationships based on a traditional sub-ethnic division to a great extent underlie those countries’ sociopolitical development and political elite recruitment.
The predominant role of clans and families in the sociopolitical structure of society in Central Asia resulted from the re-traditionalization and of society after obtaining independence when the “hand of Moscow” could no longer act as a modernization agent. It was inevitable that the Central Asian states lapsed into sociopolitical traditionalism, which was true of both the political and economic elite and the population in general. Three generations were not enough for tribal and clan relationships to sink into oblivion. Tribalism and regionalism artfully adapted to the new conditions. The economic crisis after the USSR’s breakup decreased living standards extraordinarily. Struggle for survival consolidated people of the same kindred, which in turn led to the re-emergence of new clan associations and cliental relationships. The analysis of political evolution in the five Central Asian states confirms this assumption.

Kazakhstan

The attempts to force out the Russian-speaking citizens from Kazakhstan (still the majority of the population) after independence was obtained gave rise to the Kazakhs’ political, economic, and cultural hegemony and traditional principles of organization, extended to society at large. 

Kazakhstani society is traditionally divided according to the Zhuz principle (zhuz, “hundred”, “horde”). The zhuz are tribal unions similar to North Caucasian teips. There are three zhuz in Kazakhstan, divided territorially: Great, Middle, and Lesser. The Great Zhuz does not mean the largest, but consists of the noblest clans.

The Zhuz principle underlay the sociopolitical structure of traditional nomadic society. The Kazakh zhuz was shaped on the basis of ethnic principle, in contrast, for example, to Uzbekistan and Tajikistan where clans were divided territorially. The ties between different elements of the vertical power structure were not strictly institutional but personified as in patron-client relationships. They permeated all power relationships superposed over clans that were closed societal groups.

The Russian imperial colonial administration and the Soviet leadership fought the Zhuz principle, but it survived and continued to play an important part.

Since obtaining independence, the clan structure became obvious though compounded with economic problems and extensive corruption. Clan (or sub-ethnic) identity serves as a supporting element of privileged patronage practices and patron-client relationships, because the identity that was previously concealed is now a matter of pride. Consanguinity dependence, becoming increasingly strong, stems in part from the purposeful campaign conducted by the government to revive clan identity as the groundwork for Kazakhstani statehood.

The zhuz factor should be considered in a broader context as a basis for clan solidarity. Naturally, it is not the only factor influencing the distribution of power in Kazakhstan. The clan as a group of close relatives of the second or third generation is a modification of the Zhuz principle. For the majority of the Kazakh nomenklatura and business elite, often of countryside origin, the clan is a way of becoming richer and more powerful on the basis of kindred. The clan embodies the people one can trust by virtue of consanguinity itself in the process of fierce and dangerous struggles for political and economic resources.

The ruling political elite in Kazakhstan and other Central Asian states is a symbiotic mixture of the former Soviet nomenklatura and a group of people who came to politics as a result of their clan and family bonds. This situation is popularly termed the “nephews’ economy”. In Kazakhstan, big business is directly involved in political elite recruiting more than in any other Central Asian state. The political and business elites have merged due to mutual interests and benefits and consanguinity relationships. In both cases, the parties are unified by informal ties, which helps one party to enhance its importance and the other party to multiply its resources. In other words, the functioning informal institutions reflect cliental relationships within the Kazakhstani political and economic elite.

Much more dangerous than the rivalry between clans and zhuzes is the tendency of the consolidation of power and economic resources by the family clan of President Nursultan Nazarbayev, in trying to establish his full control over the economy, foreign trade, and mass media. The previously predominant albeit limited inter-zhuz balance has been replaced by the “one people-one zhuz-one clan” formula. Even in the case of the president’s sudden death or disability, power will remain in the hands of the Family and Great Zhuz, controlling all special and military agencies and political structures. 

Many persons having dealings with the Nazarbayev family are neither the President’s relatives nor even Kazakhs. Yet their money makes up for the lack of family bonds. The situation reminds one of the relationships within the Russian political and economic elite under President Yeltsin, also an example of fusion between political power and business by means of patron-client relationships.

The important role of clan and family bonds and business ties aggravates the problem of corruption among officials, including Nazarbayev and his family.

Thus the family, clan, zhuz, and ethnic factors of consolidation within the Kazakhstani elite can be regarded as manifestations of patron-client relationships. 

Kyrgyzstan

The formation of patron-client relationships in Kyrgyzstani politics is determined by a complex system of traditional and neo-traditional factors at different levels. At the national level, it is a long standing conflict between the Northern and Southern Kyrgyz sub-ethnic communities. At the sub-national level, the Kyrgyz identify themselves with one of the three clan groups called “wings” – Right, Left, and the Ichkilik group (that belongs to none of the wings). Each wing unites several tribes (clans). There are fourteen tribes in the north and eight in the south.

The importance of the clan factor in post-Soviet Kyrgyzstan shows that the Soviet system was able to reduce temporarily the effect of tribalism on the country’s political and social life. But the principles of tribalism and nepotism played some role during the Soviet period. In the late ‘80s-early ‘90s, the struggle between the ‘liberals’ and the ‘Communist nomenklatura was in fact the struggle between sub-ethnic elites and regional political centers for the redistribution of power.

In the post-Soviet period, tribalism was on the rise. The process culminated in the revolutionary events of March 2005 when the ‘southerners’ ousted President Askar Akayev, who represented the North.

Apart from the ethnic element as such, the North-South confrontation contains a socio-structural aspect. The Northerners have a strong tribal organization while the Southerners have relied on family and clan bonds. During the Soviet period, the North was more urbanized, Russified, and less dependent on religious traditions. The South was mainly agrarian, traditionally influenced by Uzbek civilization, with strong Islam and current re-Islamization.

A. Akayev’s rule was favorable for the new political elite based on clan and family principles and consisting of representatives of Northern clans. As a popular saying about Akayev’s regime goes, ‘In the past we were building Communism, and now we are building Keminism’ (Akayev was born in Kemin, a district in Kyrgyzstan) (Kadyrov 2003).

As in Kazakhstan, the ruling “Family” controlled not only politics but also the economy in Kyrgyzstan. Its members hoarded their wealth by patronizing their clients.

The prerequisites for Akayev’s collapse included: (a) discontent of the political elite and population in the South with the Akayev clan’s unlimited authority that doomed the South to economic and political backwardness and gave its representatives no chances to come to power; and (b) the ruling regime’s weakness. The same factors determined the outcome of the March protests. To some extent, the events were not so much a revolution as the disintegration of the state.

There have hardly been any changes since 2005. The ‘new’ political elite consists of ‘old-timers’ selected on the basis of consanguinity or representing nomenklatura. The revolutionary euphoria has practically vanished. Notwithstanding the youth’s active participation in protest action, the government lacks young capable officials.

The Southern clans, whose rights had been restricted, ousted the “Northerners”. But the role of clans, new national and regional appointment practices, and the nature of the revolution conducted by the Southern elite show that clan and family identity remain key factors in the development of the political elite in Kyrgyzstan, and cliental relationships still prevail in Kyrgyzstani politics.

Tajikistan

Acute territorial and clan antagonisms led to the civil war that lasted several years (since 1992) and in turn resulted in Tajikistan’s splitting into ethnic territories with their own subcultures and mentalities. Those groups pursued economic and political goals of their own, partly based on ideology. The Tajiks’ idea of social and political function division between regions is expressed in a popular saying: “Leninabad is ruling, Kulyab is fighting, and Pamir is dancing”.

From the 1930s until the breakup of the Soviet Union, the political elite comprised representatives of Leninabad who gained from industrialization and urbanization more than any other region. During the civil war, two regional elites allied against the opposition. But after the war, the roles changed. The Kulyab elites became the senior partner: “Kulyab won the war and usurped power in the republic”.

Despite being in power, Kulyab remains the poorest region. The Kulyabians, coming from the South, are stereotypically regarded in the North as uneducated and uncivilized people.

The situation changed to some extent in 2000-2001. After a few reshuffles, five of the eight personal advisers to President Rakhmonov were from Leninabad – an attempt to find new leverage and devoted supporters who would not depend on clan identity. Incidentally, there is no single Kulyab elite. The sub-elites of Dangara, Rakhmonov’s home district, and Farkhar (supporting Rakhmonov’s major political rival, the Mayor of Dushanbe and Speaker of the Upper House) predominate while representatives of other Kulyab districts are demoted or pressed out.

Rakhmonov’s recent attempts to strengthen his position provoked an acute confrontation between the regions, reaffirming the contradiction between the regional discord and the need for the preservation of the State.

Turkmenistan

Cliental relationships in Turkmenistan are based on a few dozen tribes. Tribal identity also underlies the division into regional clans.
During the modernization period, the Bolsheviks quickly eliminated not only anti-Communist insurgents but also the traditional elite as such. Yet the struggle against tribalism and nepotism could not completely resolve the issue in Turkmenistan as in other Central Asian republics.

After obtaining independence, tribalism has played a major part in political elite recruitment. Key positions are held by the Akhal-Teke, followed by the Teke and only then the rest of the Turkmen representatives. In other words, tribalism that forms the ethnic clientele is graphically expressed in the rivalry between the clans of the Akhal oasis (where the capital is situated) and clans in other regions.

In spite of the tribal nature of the ruling elite, clan solidarity functions by default, and demonstrating any clan loyalty is as dangerous as in the Soviet period. Being a president, Niyazov formally expressed his negative attitude toward any attempts to create family clans within the government. But in reality, the struggle against tribalism and nepotism is aimed to press out the non-Akhal-Teke.

And also acting president now In Turkmenistan does not need a clan of his own: here a person in power automatically acquires clients, his relatives and clansmen. Clan mentality makes it easier to pursue the policy of tribal hegemonism without declaring it. 

Today the political struggle is centered around the relationships between the president and regional elite leaders.

It should be noted that the struggle for power in Turkmenistan is being waged not between different tribes but between the hegemonic tribe and the rest of the tribes. Under Niyazov’s dictatorship he tried to unite the Turkmen around the capital tribe, but the result of this consolidation was just the opposite – anti-Akhal-Teke. That the opposition relied on the non-Akhal-Teke clans was a distinctive feature of the domestic political struggle.

The national flag, the national anthem, and the national emblem of independent Turkmenistan reflect the tribal division of society. While paying lip service to unity, the tribal discord is reflected even by means of symbols. Notwithstanding various scenarios for changing the regime, the capital clans are unlikely to share power voluntarily with anyone if the Turkmenbashi quits. Hence the cliental relationships based on ethnicity and devotion to the patron are expected to dominate in Turkmenistani politics. 

Uzbekistan

The cliental relationships in Uzbekistan are also based on clan identity, but the Uzbek clans are implicitly involved in politics in contrast to Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, where tribalism is open. Nevertheless, they are no less strong and influence the domestic situation.

The Uzbekistani clans are territorial, not consanguine, with sub-ethnic differences between the Uzbeks living in Fergana, Khorezm, Samarkand, Tashkent, etc. Naturally, kinship bonds are important, but they do not always determine a person’s status in a clan. Clans try to place their men in major economic and political institutions and in the government to promote their clansmen, strengthen their position and financial power, and enhance their influence.

Clans played rather an important part in Soviet Uzbekistan, but after obtaining independence they were institutionalized. Clan identity and parochialism determine not only domestic but also foreign policy. Without control from Moscow and consequent personnel turnover, re-traditionalization affected the life of society, including politics and governance.

Although President Karimov’s regime may be called authoritarian and even despotic, this would not be an objective appraisal of the situation. In reality, the president is impelled into balancing between several leading clan groups. It should be noted that Islam Karimov has not practiced new appointments to the government. For many years he has been working with the same persons, time-tested officials. The replacement of top officials is quite often nothing but the realignment of clan forces. Clans constantly fight one another to access resources and gain political influence. Karimov pursues his personal benefits, but he also has to take into account the interests of strong regional groups that have their representatives in State offices, capable of organizing large-scale disturbances (disobedience campaigns, pogroms, strikes, etc.).

Today there are several regional clientele networks in domestic politics, including Fan (Fergana Valley elite), Surkash (influential representative of the southern Surkhandaria and Kashkadaria regions), Samarkand, Tashkent and Khorezm, and Karakalpakstan. Samarkand, Tashkent, and Fergana are the leading regional clans.

Apart from the regional clans, there are other influential forces; namely, the enforcement agencies – the Ministry of Interior and the National Security Service – loyal to the president. Often acting far beyond their jurisdiction, they have financial and field personnel resources of their own, try to influence political decision-making, and actively participate in clan intrigues.

Regional clans are divided into sub-ethnic groups.
There are two clans currently in power – Tashkent and Samarkand. The third strong clan – Fergana –is practically isolated from power.

Built into the government and other structures, clans strengthen the authoritarian regime. The regime in turn does not interfere in clans’ autonomy in their regions and industries.
As a result of the tacit division of major industries and sectors (oil and gas, finance and banking, agro-industrial and trade sectors) among top clans, the persons representing concrete clans use the industrial and sectoral potentials for their interests. Clan leaders heading industries and sectors try to increase the representation of their clans.

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Thus, the deep-rooted sub-ethnicity-based cliental relationships, that to a great extent determine the power hierarchy, stipulate the weakness of modern sociopolitical institutions and the inability to ensure sustainability and safety in society in Central Asian post-communist states. Furthermore, informal patronage and back-benefit practices are being institutionalized, replacing legal structures. Social and political mobility beyond the patron-client framework become simply impossible. The clientele and the elites are trying to perpetuate cliental relationships not only for rational reasons but also intuitively for the unwillingness to live under other forms of societal organization. The ongoing re-traditionalization of society, also caused by the deep socioeconomic crisis, spreads inter-clan discord and enhances its role. Widespread clan and cliental relationships in Central Asia prove the deficiency of national unity and identity that underlie national statehood and undermine the nation states already formed. The main problem, however, is that the clan-based regimes are not developing but regressing.

Byelorussian Bureaucratic Elite

The development of Byelorussia is an exception from the post-Soviet evolution of the CIS countries - an exception in many respects. First of all, one should underscore that Byelorussia is the only country within the CIS where the experts have recorded stable economic growth instead of economic collapse. The rates of Byelorussia’s economic growth are the highest in Europe; in industry they amounted to 17 % in 1997 and to 15 % in 2004. GDP grew by 10% (Shevtsov 2005: 216), nevertheless 25 % of the budget is being spent on undoing the consequences of the Chernobyl nuclear power plant accident. Byelorussia’s political history can serve as an illustration of the thesis that the model of development of a society interacts with the model of elite recruitment. Byelorussia’s post-Soviet evolution unfolded within the mobilization development pattern. Government bureaucracy became the agent of this model’s implementation. The exceptional significance of the bureaucratic principle, as the basis for elite recruitment and rotation, is Byelorussia’s specific elite formation seen as the aspect in which we are most interested. 

There is a whole range of factors – historical, economic and political – that have determined the genesis of the Byelorussian political elite. As for history, the Second World War exercised key influence on the formation of the Byelorussian political class, since the entire political class of pre-war BSSR was eliminated during the course of the War. The political elite of post-war Byelorussia was almost exclusively composed of the “guerrilla” generation who distinguished themselves in the war and ensured the republic’s industrial breakthrough after the war. They receded from the political scene due to natural causes, and a new generation of leaders replaced them. These were ‘directors’, ‘economy managers’ recruited from the corps of big industry managers and from the social groups near them.

“The present leaders – the Lukashenko team – are a new generation of Byelorussian administrative managers who replaced economic managers…. There are no internal splits within this generation and no explicit clan or cultural divisions. There are no groupings beyond control from Minsk. This is something that one has to be mindful of while trying to think of Byelorussian ‘revolutions’: Lukashenko’s team will replace him when he is gone. There are no other administrative managers in Byelorussia” (Shevtsov 2005:77).

A peculiarity of all post-war generations of the political class in Byelorussia is that it does not have any intrinsic splits. This does not preclude periodic purges at the top of the present vertical power structure in Byelorussia, but quite often these purges are aimed against corruption.

The specificity of the Byelorussian economy has played a major part in the nation’s political class configuration. By the time of the USSR’s downfall, Byelorussia’s economy was super-industrialized, export-oriented (80 % of its output was exported) and highly concentrated (50% of enterprises employed more than 500 people). Super-industrialization has hampered reform accomplishments in Byelorussia, following suit of other post-socialist countries because the stoppage of enterprises that formed entire towns (and these were a majority) would have meant a social collapse that would be impossible to overcome in a self-reliant way. 

The third in importance, but not the least factor for Byelorussia’s specificity, was the Chernobyl accident. Seventy percent of the radiation ejected at the moment of the Chernobyl nuclear power plant accident fell on the territory of Byelorussia; 20% of Byelorussia’s territory was contaminated; 20-40% of the country’s population lives in the radiation-afflicted territory. It would not be an overstatement to say that the contemporary Byelorussian nation is a disaster-stricken nation. Experts say that Byelorussia’s present spiritual self-isolation from the rest of Europe is considerably due to the Chernobyl accident (Shevtsov 2005:178). President Lukashenko came from the region that suffered more than others from the Chernobyl disaster. It is no surprise, therefore, that he enjoys maximum support there. 

The abovementioned factors have determined the specificity of the Byelorussian political class. In many regions of the former USSR, big enterprises and industrial managers could become the social basis for development policy, but it was only in Byelorussia that they were able to score a victory. One should keep in mind that the support of a strong central government was not conditioned by any ideological considerations but, rather, by a pragmatic interest in the nation’s survival and development (ibid. p. 119). One should take note of an important thing: Byelorussia’s path was not a path of resisting market economy reforms. This was a different, exclusive, if not explicable, path, to perform market economy reforms. Byelorussia simply adapted itself to the market economy, not by means of small businesses and shock therapy but, instead, by means of adapting big enterprises to the reforming external markets. As a result, the Byelorussian path proved a success: in 2004 Byelorussia’s industry surpassed the 1990 level by 40 % (Shevtsov 2005:120).

Surely, while speaking about contemporary Belorussia, we cannot and should not ignore the authoritarian character of the ruling regime in the country. It is so evident that it needs no comment. But the problem of development is somewhat deeper than the question of the regime’s character only, and needs to be considered beyond an ideological framework.

Semi-Modernization Elites: Russian Version

The “clan” concept is the one most used in the literature on contemporary Russian elites. From a formal point of view this concept is not quite precise, since both relative and ethnic ties are not obligatory features of Russian elites (Ruthland 1997). However the Russian clans have the same typical features (secrecy, especially corporate-particular orientations, etc.) which constitute the core of clan relations (Peregudov 1998: 147; Peregudov 2003; Peregudov 2004; Gaman-Golutvina 2006a).

The wide-scale economic and political reforms of the 1990’s were accompanied by revolutionary changes in the traditional-for-Russia elite-recruitment model: a relatively homogeneous nomenclature turning into an association of political and economic clans, pretending to make key political decisions (Wasilewski 1998). The implementation of such a deep transformation in an historically short term (five to seven years) testifies that in that period we dealt with the tectonic changes which had emerged earlier. Actually, by the end of the soviet period, a lot of sub-groups appeared inside the nomenclature shell (though they were weakly shaped). There was not enough room in the mother nomenclature shell for these groups; they were awaiting the proper time for conversion of the various early accumulated resources into financial capital.

In the course of the reforms, the political role of the business elite, in elaborating the political course and in political establishment recruitment, grew considerably. Moreover, for the first time in Russian history the business representatives entered the political elite. Thus, Yeltsin’s economic reforms of the 1990’s caused, as its consequence, transformation of the elite recruitment model, much deeper than that which had taken place in 1917 (Gaman-Golutvina 2006a). Then, the elite-formation model changed only its exterior form, while its core principle was left untouched. The 1990’s oligarchic elite-recruitment model gradually replaced the bureaucratic one.

It is worth mentioning such a key characteristic of the largest Russian elite clans under Yeltsin, such as their self-sufficiency. By this I mean self-sufficiency in a “feudal” sense, since the oligarchic empires formed in the 1990’s gained their own financial and industrial potentials, their own security services, their proteges in power bodies at different levels in military and special services (Ministry of Interior Affairs, General Prosecutor’s Office, courts, etc.), and their own analytic services; their own allies in the political opposition ranks. We can state that these oligarchic empires looked like quasi-feudal states.

The high level of self-sufficiency of elite clans gives us the opportunity to note the tendency toward quasi-feudalization of the elite-formation model in Russia under Yeltsin. Thus, in Russia of the 1990’s, the reconstruction of the European elite-formation model of the feudal, not contemporary, West took place. In contemporary Western countries the autonomy of the state as regards corporate interests is not dismantled (Page and Wright 1999).

Another important peculiarity of the Yeltsin elite was the identification of state interests with corporate ones, a ‘privatisation’ of the state instituted by clans, pretending to replace the state and to fulfil its functions. Paradoxically the famous Marxian prophecy concerning the extinction of the state under communism came into being in post-communist Russia: not only were industries privatised, but the state institutes as well. The oligarchic nature of elite-formation is the most evident feature of the substantial transformation of the elite-recruitment model, which occurred in Russia in the course of the 1990’s reforms. By the middle of the 1990’s, property became the source of political influence, and first of all, the property of the state institutes.  The gin has gone out of the bottle. The oligarchs, grown by the state in one’s time, obtained the ambitions to dictate their will to the state.   

The unlimited predominance of oligarchy naturally resulted in default on the 17th of August, 1998. The ensuing total discrediting of the oligarchy-affiliated political class gave bureaucracy a chance to return to its leading political role. The appointment of E. Primakov as Prime Minister and the promotion of Moscow Mayor Y. Luzkov as a federal politician, coupled with the formation of his own political movement, “Fatherland,” signified an attempt at nomenclature revenge.

However, the attempt at a nomenclature renaissance was interrupted twice. The first time was in May of 1999, when Yeltsin, under strong pressure from the oligarchs, dismissed Primakov. It happened a second time after the defeat of the Primakov-Luzkov movement, “Fatherland,” in the 1999 parliamentary elections (December, 1999). As a result, the origin of the bureaucracy of nomenclature was wrecked. I am stressing: it was the wreck of nomenclature bureaucracy, not bureaucracy in general. This notion is grounded not only on the personal exclusion of the people with nomenclature backgrounds out of the highest power echelons, but also on the defeat of the nomenclature political mentality and appropriate technologies of political leadership. The nomenclature mentality is based upon two foundations: the stability of the game rules, and the behind the scene character of the political struggle (nomenclature politics, per Churchill, is the fight of bulldogs under the carpet). The public psychological discredit of bureaucrats Primakov and Luzhkov played a decisive role in the defeat of nomenclature bureaucracy.

Meanwhile contemporary Russian politics is a public game without rules, not only in the sense that the infringement of taboos became a rule, and also in the sense that the stability of political senses and values are fundamentally doubtful. Under such circumstances the advantage is inevitably on the side of those who are adapted to this type of game. 

This is a new generation of bureaucracy (though age itself is not very important – we mean first of all the change in mentality and behaviour) that differs from the soviet nomenclature. The latter considered ideological identification to be quite important, while the new generation of political elites shares a utilitarian philosophy: “what is useful, that is true”. As regards structural aspects in terms of J. Higley\'s typology, this transformation may be also considered as a transformation of an ideocratic elite to a fragmented one (Higley, Bayulgen, George, 2003: 13-14). The new generation of bureaucracy is ready to multipath combinations and games with oligarchs and ready to design new mechanisms and channels of communications with other public and behind-the-scenes actors. Exactly this cohort composed the backbone of the political class formed under Vladimir Putin.

Conclusions

Thus, having studied the three major typological forms of elite organization in the CIS states, one can see that the elites’ re-traditionalization and society’s de-modernization are interdependent and mutually conditioned processes. The major common model that brought the elites back to traditionalization in those CIS countries that experienced a re-traditionalization, was the model of patron-client relationship that has determined the whole system while manifesting itself in various modifications. In some cases the clienteles’ dominant foundation are the specific national entities (for example, zhuz in Kazakhstan, complemented with kindred and family relations); in other cases this is family-kindred, ethnic and/or confessional community; or in some other cases – a regional consolidation (Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and, in part, Uzbekistan). Even a full-fledged sultanate is possible when the whole population of a country finds itself in the position of vassals (as is the case in Turkmenistan). Sometimes a clientele comes about in the process of mutual penetration between the representatives of power and business, who are not kin but are bound together by common economic interests. But, as is shown by the experience of Russia and Kazakhstan, in these cases, too, the representatives of the ruling families act as rapprochement channels. The experience of the CIS countries shows that there can be various combinations of different formation entities that ensure consolidation within the elite, that can become basic to the emergence of odd sets of regional and family clans (the case of Kyrgyzstan), family businesses (in Russia under Yeltsin) and other symbiotic entities.

The study of functional features within this range of possible arrangements reveals an affinity of the entities under review: their focus exclusively on clan interests and their failure as development agents in their states. Absolute majorities of the populations in the countries of Central Asia and Transcaucasia live below the poverty line. This failure puts into question the elite status of the ruling groups because they are inadequate as to an elite’s fundamental mission. The latter, as is known, implies not only an involvement in the decision-making (a decision approach) but also an alignment between the decisions taken and the interests of the governed community, i.e. with the populations of their countries. The ruling CIS groups reviewed in this context appear in the capacity of politicians (who, as is known, are concerned with the next election) rather then in  the capacity of state rulers (called upon to take care of their countries’ futures). Catastrophic declines in the living standards of the masses of the populations are neither an accidental nor unexpected effect of clan governance. Instead, this is a predictable result of elite recruitment on the basis of clientele relationships rather than on professional competency principles.

In this connection a question arises as to whether or not the strategic impotence of clan regimes is their attributive feature or a specific feature of state formations of the post-Soviet type. The study of world experience shows that the consequences of clientelism are ambiguous (though in most cases they are certainly negative). For instance, many ruling regimes in South East Asia include clientelism to some degree. In so doing, in certain countries, informal interpersonal relationships have not interfered with rapid development (as was the case in Singapore), while in other countries they accompanied corruption.

Indeed, the generally pessimistic picture within the CIS seems to have started to change. Development policy steps have been taken in Kazakhstan. N. Nazarbayev, who was going to have his elder daughter inherit his presidency, has now changed his intentions and is not going to retire, after winning a victory in the presidential election in December 2005 and having scored 90% of the votes (which is not very surprising for this region). Moreover, he declared plans for large-scale modernization of the economy and the social sphere. For instance, plans have been announced to increase GDP in 2007 to $ 7,000 per person (which means $15,000 in terms of the purchasing capacity in the region). Allocations for education and health are planned to become closer to the standards of advanced countries: 4,1 % of the GDP for the former and 3% of the GDP for the latter. However, this is as yet a declaration. But the main thing consists in the fact that this modernization effort is a fortuity rather than a regularity for the clan regimes that are recruiting elites on principles that are a far cry from the demands of ‘rational bureaucracy’ and rational ruling.

Against the general CIS picture one can see certain successes for Russia that were made possible only after the break-up of the corrupt symbiosis between power and business of Yeltsin’s epoch. Nevertheless, the new Russian bureaucracy has not managed yet to solve the key problem of the country – the problem of ensuring economic development. Now we observe in Russia growth without going ahead, growth without development. During the years of economic reforms the petro-state in Russia was formed. The share of the oil and gas industry income in Russian GDP almost doubled – from 11 to 19.5 percent.; it is more than in Columbia, Venezuela and other raw-expert-oriented countries. Only in Nigeria is the fuel share in GDP higher than in Russia. Incomes from raw exports have reached 65 to 68 percent, making Russia vulnerable as a global competition participant (Lane 2000; Baron 2005).

Russia is lagging behind as regards intellectualisation of the economy. According to Davos’ 2005 Forum data, Russia occupies 62nd place within the competitiveness rating when looking at the criteria of the IT use in the economy (1st place is occupied by Singapore; the USA is in 5th place). Though Russia occupies 12-14th place on the GDP scale, its GDP per person does not allow it to rise higher than a 40-point threshold. And this is so in spite of the fact that Putin\'s rule has coincided with extremely favorable oil prices, which could open up possibilities for structural economic reform in favor of high-technology industries. Owing to oil sales income, Russia occupies the 5th place in the world on fold-currency reserves, though neither these assets, nor the huge Stabilisation Fund, are used for modernisation aims.

Besides, the bitter struggle waged by the oligarchy clans and bureaucracy is still going on. The recent ‘transposition’ between the Russian Federation General Prosecutor and the Minister of Justice can be seen as an echo of this struggle (Gaman-Golutvina 2006b). Abrupt ups and downs in Russia’s policies in the past fifteen years allow one to discern a correlation between elite structures and the course that they pursue. To be sure, it is incorrect to reduce the problem of the modernization agent exclusively to the role played by the state in the post-industrial epoch, but it is impossible to implement modernization outside active state policy and active bureaucracy; but without efficient bureaucracy as an agent of modernization, development in the CIS countries is quite challenged.


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